Showing posts with label Papers. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Papers. Show all posts

Saturday, April 27, 2013

Hong Kong Regulator Releases Consultation Conclusions on Regulation of Electronic Trading

The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), Hong Kong published a consultation conclusions paper on proposals to enhance the regulatory framework for electronic trading (Note 1).

The SFC received 34 written submissions from industry associations, brokerage firms, investment banks and individuals in response to the proposals contained in the consultation paper.  Respondents generally supported the proposals.  Most of the initiatives have been adopted in the conclusions. 

“The initiatives are intended to provide clarity to intermediaries on the standards that they are expected to meet when they conduct electronic trading.  They must have appropriate policies, procedures and controls in place to ensure their electronic trading activities will not pose undue risks to the market,” the SFC’s Chief Executive Officer Mr Ashley Alder said.

“These standards, which are in line with regulations in major international markets and the principles published by the International Organization of Securities Commissions, will help maintain integrity as well as confidence in the market,” he added.

Key aspects of the regulatory regime include:
  • Management and supervision- The responsibility to ensure compliance rests with the responsible officers or executive officers and the management of the intermediaries. 
  • Adequacy of system- Intermediaries should ensure their electronic trading systems are subject to testing and meet regulatory standards with respect to reliability, controls, security and capacity and that contingency measures in place.  
  • Record keeping- Intermediaries should keep, or cause to be kept, proper records on the design, development, deployment and operation of their electronic trading systems.
  • Risk management - Intermediaries should put in place risk management and supervisory controls to monitor orders and trades, including automated pre-trade controls and regular post-trade monitoring. 
The new regime which includes amendments to the Code of Conduct for Persons Licensed by or Registered with the Securities and Futures Commission and the Fund Manager Code of Conduct will come into effect on 1 January 2014.  The Guidance Note on Internet Regulation issued in March 1999 will be repealed on the same date.

"The Financial Holding Companies Bill 2013" - Second Reading Speech by Mr Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister in charge of MAS

This is an official speech published on Monetary Authority of Singapore website.

The Financial Holding Companies Bill introduces a regulatory framework for the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) to regulate financial holding companies (FHCs) and their financial groups. For the purpose of the Bill, an FHC is a non-operating holding company which is incorporated in Singapore and holds a Singapore bank or insurance subsidiary, or both.

The FHC Bill will provide greater clarity to the industry and other stakeholders on the rules and standards applicable to financial groups organised under FHCs in Singapore. It is common for internationally active financial groups to be organised under holding companies. As Singapore develops as an international financial centre, more global banks and insurance companies are locating parts of their global operations in Singapore. At the same time, our domestic financial institutions are growing regionally and some may find a holding company structure more suited to their purpose.  

The Bill will clarify and ensure appropriate MAS’ prudential oversight of financial groups in Singapore. Group-wide supervision allows MAS to assess the impact that a financial institution’s relationships with other entities in the group may have on its safety and soundness. The concept of group supervision is of course not new. Financial groups in Singapore are mostly headed by banks, and are already subject to group-wide supervision by MAS. The Bill extends group-wide supervision by MAS to an FHC and its financial group. It is aimed at mitigating intra-group contagion risks, preventing the multiple use of capital within the group, and limiting concentration risks at the group level.

The FHC Bill is in line with international regulatory developments. Key international supervisory committees such as the Joint Forum have called for greater oversight of unregulated entities in financial groups, in particular the parent FHC.2 The IMF has also cited the limited legal authority over FHCs of cross-sector financial groups as a weakness in some financial systems. Many regulators are therefore widening their scope of group-wide supervision to include FHCs, either directly through an FHC regulatory framework or indirectly through a regulated entity like a bank or insurance subsidiary. Australia, Canada and the US are among the countries that have established legal frameworks for FHCs. The EU is moving in the same direction of strengthening regulatory authority over FHCs. 

However, the introduction of this Bill does not mean that MAS is advocating a holding company structure for financial institutions in Singapore. Whether a financial group organises itself under an FHC or is held directly by a bank or insurance company is a business decision. MAS, as the financial regulator, needs to ensure that all financial groups in Singapore, regardless of their holding structure, can be effectively regulated and supervised under an appropriate regulatory framework.

MAS has consulted the industry on the FHC regulatory framework. The first consultation in February 2012 sought views on the broad policy and regulatory principles underpinning the framework. The second consultation in October 2012 invited comments on the draft FHC Bill. MAS has considered the views and feedback received and taken them into account in refining the FHC Bill, where appropriate. 

Mdm Speaker, let me expand on the key provisions of the Bill.

KEY PROVISIONS IN THE FHC BILL

FHC Bill Complements Banking and Insurance Acts

The FHC Bill draws upon the same regulatory toolkit as in the Banking Act (BA) and Insurance Act (IA). These tools will include requiring regulatory approval for acquiring or holding of major shareholdings in an FHC; putting in place limits on an FHC’s credit and investment exposures, and giving MAS powers relating to key appointments, supervision, and inspection.

Scope of Regulation

The Bill does not require every FHC in Singapore to be regulated by MAS. Unlike banks and insurance companies, an FHC is a non-operating holding company, and will not engage in financial transactions directly with the public. It may also not be exposed to the same risks that a bank or insurance company may encounter in the course of business. In deciding which FHCs to regulate, MAS will consider how the regulation of the FHC and its financial group can enhance the effectiveness of prudential oversight of the financial group. 

The FHC Bill sets out the following criteria by which MAS will assess whether an FHC should be designated for regulation.  
(a) Ultimate parent of Singapore financial groups MAS will regulate an FHC if it is the ultimate parent of a financial group with a bank or insurance subsidiary in Singapore. In such cases, MAS is the home supervisor of the financial group and has responsibility for group-wide supervision of the financial group.
(b) Intermediate FHCs within financial groupsThere are FHCs that are themselves subsidiaries of a parent FHC or financial institution. For these intermediate FHCs, MAS will assess the importance of the FHC’s bank or insurance subsidiary to Singapore’s financial system, or to the intermediate FHC group, when deciding whether to regulate the FHC. For foreign-owned FHCs, an additional consideration will be the extent to which the parent holding company incorporated overseas is subject to effective group-wide supervision by its home supervisor.

MAS will list the names of FHCs designated for regulation in an order published in the Gazette. 

While FHCs that are not designated will not be regulated under the FHC Bill, MAS may require these FHCs to provide information necessary for MAS’ surveillance and supervision functions. 

Control of Shareholdings

Major shareholders of an FHC may be in a position to exercise indirect influence or control over its bank or insurance subsidiaries through their shareholding interests in the FHC. Hence it is necessary to require shareholders with substantial or controlling interests in designated FHCs to obtain approval for their shareholding interests, just as the BA and IA currently require for significant stakes in Singapore-incorporated banks and insurance companies. The shareholding and control thresholds at which approval will be required will be consistent with existing thresholds under the BA and the IA. MAS will consider whether the shareholders are “fit-and-proper” and the nature of their likely influence over the conduct of the FHC when assessing applications for approval.  

It is also vital that the directors and senior management of the designated FHC carry out their functions in a responsible and prudent manner. The FHC Bill provides for the application of corporate governance regulations on the FHC.

Regulation and Supervision of FHC Groups

Besides regulatory requirements on the designated FHC itself, the FHC Bill sets out requirements at the FHC group level. To achieve alignment in the regulatory approach towards financial groups, whether they are held under a bank, an insurance company or a designated FHC, regulatory requirements under the BA and IA will be mirrored in the FHC Bill, where appropriate. The FHC’s bank and insurance subsidiaries in Singapore will continue to be regulated under the BA and IA, respectively. 

The FHC Bill empowers MAS to prescribe rules to support the safety and soundness of the FHC group. Several of these rules are also present in the BA and IA and will be extended to designated FHCs. The FHC Bill also provides for MAS to conduct on-site inspections and investigations of the FHC and its subsidiaries. 

Administrative Provisions

Further, to support MAS’ administration of the FHC regulatory and supervisory framework, the FHC Bill contains administrative provisions, including powers to:
  • make regulations, and issue directions and notices to designated FHCs;
  • require the submission of annual audited accounts of the FHC and FHC group; and
  • impose penalties on the FHC and individuals for the contravention of FHC regulations.
CONCLUSION

Mdm Speaker, let me conclude. Singapore’s financial system has held up well amid the turbulence of the global financial crisis of the past few years. It is important that MAS continues to have the appropriate and necessary regulatory tools to discharge its responsibilities as the financial landscape evolves. The introduction of the FHC Bill represents the continuous effort by MAS to ensure its regulations stay relevant to developments and challenges in the financial system.

Monday, June 11, 2012

The Future of New Zealand Competition Law

Present blog is the gist of speech of Craig Fross released from Ministry of Commerce of New Zealand.

"Thank you for the introduction and for inviting me to speak today. Based on the calibre of presenters and the agenda for the next two days, this year's conference will no doubt provide some challenging and stimulating discussion around competition law, policy and regulation in New Zealand.

I would like to start by explaining the government's key policy objectives, because these drive the reforms.  At the broadest level, the government has four key policy objectives for the next three years."

These are:
 •responsibly managing the Government's finances;
 •building a more competitive and productive economy;
 •delivering better public services; and
 •supporting the rebuild of Christchurch.

For New Zealand to realise its potential, it's essential that we build a more competitive and productive economy.  Effective competition spurs innovation, which in turn underpins the productivity of individual firms and the public sector.

Competition law promotes a competitive culture in New Zealand, it is an important tool because it applies to all sectors, except those specifically exempt.

The Commerce Act is designed to incentivise competitive behaviour through prohibiting anti-competitive practices. Clear and robust legislation is an important part of the regime but it alone cannot achieve the Government's objectives.

I'd like to spend a moment commenting on the other institutions that have an important role to play: the Commerce Commission, the courts, commentators and you - the people that advise business.

The Commerce Commission helps build a more competitive and productive economy through administering and enforcing the law.

Over the past year the Commission has honed its focus on lifting voluntary compliance by placing greater emphasis on helping businesses understand what they need to do to comply with the law.

 To do this, the Commission has focused on education initiatives and improving the quality of engagement with stakeholders. The work done to raise awareness in the construction sector is a great example of using softer methods to promote compliance with the Act, and it is my understanding that this has been very successful.

Advisors also play a significant role in ensuring that the competition regime operates as intended.
The Commerce Act does not set out prescriptive rules.

It is principle-based.

This means it is essential that advisors understand the purpose of the Act.

This enables advisors to provide savvy advice, which in turn will facilitate pro-competitive business transactions.

Courts also play an important role.  High quality judicial precedent plays an integral part in building a more productive and competitive economy.

To the extent that cases come before the Courts, the Commission and advisors also have a role in influencing how the judiciary understands the purpose and structure of the legislation.

We cannot forget about the commentators. We need them.

Their critiques of decisions contribute to the quality of debate and ultimately improve the quality of decision-making.

Commentators generate discussion. This has to be a good thing. Academics and advisors can also play a role in holding the courts and the Commission to account.  This contributes to quality debate on policy and legislative issues.

Similarly forums such as this conference allow a detailed discussion of  developments in competition law and policy increase the capability of all institutions.

This makes it a real privilege for me to talk today because as Minister of Commerce I see my role as supporting the network of people and institutions that will help build a more competitive and productive economy.

This brings me to the final feature of our competition regime that is integral to the promotion of a competitive culture in New Zealand: the legislation.

As you will be aware, there are currently two bills before Parliament designed to improve the operation and enforcement of competition law in New Zealand. These are the Commerce Commission (International Co-operation and Fees) Bill, and the Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) Amendment Bill.

The Cartels Bill in particular is a significant piece of law reform as the competition provisions of the Commerce Act have not been subject to any substantial amendment since 2001.

I know many of you here today have participated in the policy development of these Bills, and I commend those of you who have done so.

I would like to spend a few moments talking about how the Cartels Bill furthers the Government's policy objectives and key issues that were considered as part of the policy process.

The Cartels Bill is about enabling business.

It does a lot more than just criminalise hard-core cartel conduct.

It enbables business to entire into pro-competitive, innovative and efficient collaborative activity.

This Bill will:
 • Clarify the scope of the prohibition.
 •Introduce a collaborative activity exemption
 •Introduce a clearance regime so that businesses can test with the Commission to find out whether their proposed collaborative activity gets the green light.

The initial stages of the policy process focused on whether or not to criminalise hard-core cartel conduct….so it is understandable that when people think about the Bill, they focus on criminal sanctions.

BUT, this Bill does so much more.

It aims to clarify the scope of the prohibition against hard-core cartels, in part by introducing the collaborative activity exemption.  The scope of the collaborative activity exemption is broad and focuses on the substance of the activity, not the form of the arrangement. As a result, it should apply to all pro-competitive collaborations.

The collaborative activity exemption has also been designed so that businesses can assess for themselves whether their proposed collaboration falls within the exemption.  The exemption sends a clear signal that the Government recognises that pro-competitive, innovative and efficiency enhancing collaborative activities are essential to New Zealand realising its productive potential.

The design of the prohibition is critical.

I don't think we would have achieved our policy objectives had we introduced criminal sanctions while retaining the current prohibition.

In considering whether to criminalise hard-core cartel conduct, my predecessor Simon Power had regard to the Legislative Advisory Committee Guidelines.

He identified three factors of particular relevance and I'd like to spend a moment discussing these.

The Guidelines suggest that regard should be had to the following questions:
 •Will the conduct in question, if permitted or allowed to continue unchecked cause substantial harm to individual or public interests?
•Is the conduct that is to be categorised as a criminal offence able to be defined with precision?
•Would public opinion support the use of the criminal law, or is the conduct in question likely to be regarded as trivial by the general public?

These questions are crucial because they focus both on the legislative design but also on the role of the various institutions in making the regime work.

During the policy process some submissions suggested that the scope of the prohibition was unclear and may prohibit pro-competitive conduct.  To some extent, some of the discomfort with criminalisation appeared to be a product of uncertainty about the current law.

Given the feedback about the current prohibition, answering the questions posed by the Guidelines becomes problematic.  Obviously if the current prohibition seems to capture or hinder pro-competitive behaviour from occurring, allowing this to continue does not cause substantial harm.

A large part of the policy process was about listening to competition law experts and business about how we could get the design of the Bill right.

The Bill specifically aims to clarify the scope of the prohibited conduct and provide safeguards - namely the collaborative activity exemption and clearance regime - to encourage businesses to continue to find ways to collaborate and innovate in a way that builds their productive and competitive capacity.

The government is not shy about the fact that people intentionally participating in hard-core cartels deserve to go to jail.

Any behaviour that distorts prices and undermines the competitiveness of New Zealand markets - is not acceptable.

People that intentionally participate in hard-core cartels deserve to be sanctioned in the same way as those that participate in tax evasion, fraud and other white collar crimes.

We know these are significant changes. To provide greater certainty, the government has invited the Commerce Commission to:
 •Develop prosecution guidelines that outline when they would take a criminal prosecution; and
 •undertake further advocacy work to promote better understanding of the prohibitions in the Commerce Act.

These reforms will also have a significant impact on the operation of the legislative regime.  Cabinet has agreed to sequence the introduction of the new regime so that the majority of the regime will come into force on the day the Act receives royal assent, but to delay the commencement of criminal sanctions. This should leave sufficient time for the regime to bed-in, alleviating some of the uncertainty.

While the amendments arose from the question of whether or not to introduce criminal sanctions for hard-core cartel conduct, the Bill does much more.

The design means that the focus should no longer be on criminal sanctions, but rather on facilitating pro-competitive collaborative activities.
The industry's focus must change.

If everyone continues to focus on criminal sanctions - we will miss a real opportunity to improve the current regime.

I anticipate that the Bill will receive its first reading soon, but the exact timing will depend on Parliamentary priorities.

The Bill will then be referred to the Commerce Select Committee for consideration. Select Committee provides an opportunity for legal practitioners to add value, both by identifying areas where the proposed regime could be improved, and highlighting the features of the regime that are an improvement on the current regime.

Constructive input into the legislative process at this stage is invaluable, and helps ensure that the regime has the robustness to stand the test of time.

Another important part of this suite of reforms is the Information Sharing Bill, which also ties into the amendments of the Cartels Bill. The ability for the Commerce Commission to share compulsorily-acquired information with equivalent overseas regulators is another lever the Government can use to deter anti-competitive behaviour, especially behaviour that takes place overseas but affect New Zealand.

Both the Cartels Bill and the Information-Sharing Bill represent significant reforms for New Zealand competition law, and go directly towards achieving the Government's policy objective of building a more competitive and productive economy.

As I have mentioned, this does not mean that competition law acts within a vacuum. The Commission, the Courts, commentators and advisors have a vital role to play in ensuring the workability of the law.  In this context I urge you to consider the Cartels Bill and the policy intent behind it, and encourage you to participate in the Select Committee process by identifying features of the Bill that represent an improvement, and where the Bill could be enhanced.

Again, thank you for providing me with opportunity to address you today, and I wish you all the best for the rest of the conference.

Saturday, June 9, 2012

Study Shows Decline in U.S. Share of Global Markets in 2011

The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (CCMR), an independent and nonpartisan research organization dedicated to improving the regulation and enhancing the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets, released data from the fourth quarter of 2011 and the first quarter of 2012. The value of foreign issuer-raised equity in the U.S. private markets showed a significant increase in 2011, suggesting a further decline in the relative competitiveness of the U.S. public capital markets.
 
On the other hand, while several measures of competitiveness have shown limited improvement in the first quarter of 2012, it is premature to tell whether this is an anomaly or the beginning of a broader trend. CCMR will have a better perspective on these results following the release of our quarter 2 data this summer.

Global IPOs

In 2011, U.S. equity markets captured only 8.6% (by value) of the global IPO market. This is a decrease from 14.2% in 2010 and 16.9% in 2009, and is substantially less than the historical average of 28.7% for the period 1996–2006.

Three of 2011’s 20 largest IPOs were sold on U.S. markets. This represents an improvement from only one IPO in 2010, two in 2009, and none in 2008 or 2007. However, the figure is still lower than the historical average of five IPOs for the period 1996 –2006.

U.S. Public & Private Equity Markets

In 2011, the U.S. raised 42.7% of the equity raised in worldwide public markets. This figure represents a significant increase over the 2010 figure of 30.0%. But it just reflects the fact that U.S. IPOs, of U.S. firms, were more active than IPOs of foreign companies.

At the same time, however, in 2011, the 144A market also captured a larger relative share (6.3%) of foreign issues in the U.S., a substantial increase from 3.8% in 2010. The value of foreign issuer–raised equity on the 144A market during that period was $1.32 billion, a dramatic increase over 2010’s $771 million. This shows that our public markets are still unattractive to foreign issuers who have a real choice as to whether to use them. These issuers prefer the private markets.

In addition, in 2011, a total of 11 foreign companies cross–listed their shares on U.S. exchanges without raising capital. This remains well below the historical average of 18 for the period 2000–2006.

Quarter 1 of 2012

Global IPOs

U.S. equity markets captured 17% (by value) of the global IPO markets during the first quarter of 2012. This is a significant increase over the 8.6% U.S. share in 2011, and a hopeful sign, but it still remains well below the historical average of 28.7%. The U.S. share of the 20 largest global IPOs remained relatively flat.

U.S. Public & Private Equity Markets

In the first quarter of 2012, the U.S. raised 47.4% of global equity raised in public markets. This marks a further increase over 2011 levels. Again, this just shows the active IPO for U.S. firms. More importantly, the percentage of private IPOs by foreign companies relative to total global IPOs in the U.S. decreased in the first quarter to 67.9% (from 82.5% in 2011), reflecting that foreign companies were finding U.S. public markets more attractive. This is a promising development, but the figure remains above the historical average of 64.1%.

The Committee believes that measures suggested in its 2006 Interim Report must be taken to help restore U.S. competitiveness. We also urge regulators implementing the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to minimize, to the extent possible, adverse competitive impacts, particularly in areas where the U.S. regulatory approach differs significantly from that taken in other markets.